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ALMS TO THE RICH: THE FA<;ADE EASEMENT
DEDUCTION
Wendy C. Gerzog*

This article presents the case for repeal of the fayade easement
deduction. Proponents of this benefit argue that the deduction encourages
historic preservation by reimbursing property owners for relinquishing their
right to alter the fayade of their property in a way inconsistent with that
conservation goal; however, this article shows that there are many reasons
to urge its repeal: the revenue loss, the small number of beneficiaries, the
financial demographics of that group of beneficiaries; the dubious industries
that are supported by the deduction; and the continual marked overvaluation
and abuse despite Congressional, court, and administrative review and
expense.
After the last major reform effort, the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
in 2009 only ninety-four taxpayers claimed the fayade easement charitable
deduction with an average return deduction of $477,225. While there may
be a desire to retain a tax benefit with purported charitable aims, the long
history of unbridled abuse even with repeated legislative and administrative
response should make it clear that amending the fayade easement deduction
is an unending proposition. In today's world, real estate is often subject to
regulation that buyers and their neighbors accept in order to retain and
increase a community's property values. The very wealthiest of
homeowners who purchase homes in historic districts willingly accept local
restrictions on their property's use. There is no evidence that fayade
easements significantly alter the behavior of property owners. It provides
them with huge tax savings for doing what they would do anyway.
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INTRODUCTION

Donations of fa9ade easements to conservation charities are gifts
primarily employed by a small number of very wealthy taxpayers in order
to generate huge deductions, with few, if any, benefits to the public and
without appreciably interfering with the enjoyment of the taxpayers' private
property interests. I After the last major reform, the Pension Protection Act

* Professor, University Baltimore School of Law. The author would like to thank
Profs. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Neil Buchanan, Emily Cauble, Steven Dean, Anthony Infanti,
Linda Jellum, Lily Kahng, Nan Kaufman, Tracy Kaye, Joel Newman, Shu-Yi Oei, Henry
Ordower, James Repetti, Diane Ring, Walter Schwidetzky, Linda Sugin, Keeva Terry, and
all of the participants at the 17th Annual Critical Tax Theory Conference, held at the
University of Baltimore School of Law, Apr. 4-5, 2014, for their very helpful comments.
I See Richard Rubin, IRS Cracks Down on Breaks in Land of Rich Americans,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news12013-11-06Iirs-cracks
-down-on-breaks-in-Iand-of-rich-americans.html (Dean Zerbe, who examined easement
donations as a Republican aide on the Senate Finance Committee said, "I don't know if I
could design a tax break that's more targeted toward the millionaire set."); Joe Stephens,
U.S. Targets Tax Break Tied to Fa~ade Easements, WASH. POST (July 9, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.comllocallus-seeks-to-end-tax-break-for-facade-easementdonations/2011107/05/gIQAFsH35H_story.html ("Since 2002, the Justice Department
estimates that inflated easement deductions have totaled $1.2 billion. 'These are very
wealthy people taking a massive deduction on their taxes, for plenty of nothing,' said Dean
Zerbe, who investigated abusive tax shelters while legal counsel for the Senate Finance
Committee.").
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of 2006 (PPA)2 in 2009, for example, only ninety-four taxpayers claimed
the fayade easement charitable deduction with an average return deduction
3
of $477,225.
The stated public benefit of a fayade easement is to preserve
4
historically significant structures and to give the public a chance to see the
exterior of these historic treasures. The rationale for the deduction was to
encourage historic preservation by recompensing the property owner for
giving up his right to alter the fayade of his property in a way inconsistent
5
with that goal.
It is not clear, however, that taxpayers need that tax benefit,
particularly in light of its exorbitant revenue cost. Taxpayers who purchase
homes in historic districts know that they will be subject to state and local
building restrictions. Allowing a federal income tax deduction where a
taxpayer would not have behaved differently if she did not receive a tax
6
benefit results in a waste of revenue.
Today, homeowners routinely relinquish rights to do what they want
7
with their property in order to protect private property values. When a

Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 1001, 1213, 120 Stat. 780,1075-76 (2006).
See Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2009, 31
STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 62, 63 (2012) [hereinafter 2009 Noncash Donations].
4 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv).
2

3

5 See To Review the Tax Deduction for Far;ade Easements: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong., 4 (2005)
(testimony of Jim Ramstad, Chairman) [hereinafter 2005 Far,:ade Easement Hearings].
6 See STAFF OF JOINT. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 277-284 (Comm. Print 2005) ("Whenever
possible, tax incentives should be targeted to those persons who are most lIkely to modify
their behavior in substantial part because of the provision of the tax benefit. Otherwise,
providing such benefits constitutes a windfall rather than an incentive. The present charitable
deduction regime for qualified conservation contributions provides a windfall to those
taxpayers who grant an easement or other restriction to a qualified organization if the activity
or use restricted by the easement or restriction likely would never occur. For example, a
person who purchases a residence in a historic district that has homes that were designed and
constructed in a particular period and with a particular architectural style generally does not
acquire the home with the intention of altering the exterior of the building in a manner that
would be inconsistent with the neighboring structures. Similarly, a person who acquires real
property located by a nature preserve often is attracted to the area because of the preserve,
and in such cases would not alter or use the acquired property for a purpose that would
impede or contravene such preservation efforts.") [heremafter 2005 JOINT COMM. FA<;:ADE
EASEMENT PROPOSAL].
7 The Community Associations Institute, a trade association, estimated that HOAs
governed 25.9 million American homes and 63.4 million residents in 2012. See Industry
Data, National Statistics, CMTY. ASS'N INST. (2013), http://www.caionline.org/info/
research/pages/default.aspx; FOUND. FOR CMTY. ASS'N RESEARCH, STATISTICAL REVIEW
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homeowner buys a home in an area that has a community association, the
buyer purchases her house and must agree to abide by the homeowners
association's rules, which generally restrict alterations to the exterior of the
building and to landscaping. In the historic easement and the homeowners'
association restriction scenarios, the limitations on "unsuitable" alterations
to the property owner's and his neighbors' fac;ades add value to the owner's
property. Those constraints are one of the major reasons that the restrictive
uses are so popular; despite individual owners' grumblings about having
given up some of their property rights, in the long run the owners subject to
community association rules benefit from conservation of house value and
increased market potential when they are ready to sell.
8
Aside from generating huge deductions for the rich, fac;ade easements,
ironically, only provide a tax benefit when donors are assured that their
easement grant will not depreciate the value of their property.
Representatives from conservation charities have commonly explained and
reassured potential fac;ade easement donors that they will enjoy large tax
benefits from their donations "with little to no practical effect on the use,
value, or marketability of the [easement burdened] property.,,9 Indeed,
much urban renewal is tied to restoring historical homes. 10
Fundamentally, charitable deductions are rooted in the policy that
donations to qualified organizations support the public good. I I The major

2012, 5 (2012), available at http://www.catrf.orglfoundationstatsbrochure.pdf.
8 See sources cited supra note I.
9 1982 East, LLC v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380 (2011), available at
http://www .ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/ 1982EastL LC. TCM. WPD. pdf.
10 See Scheidelman v. Commissioner (Scheidelman Ill), 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117 (T.C.
2013), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/ScheidelmanMemo. TCM. WPD.
pdf, ajJ'd, 755 F.3d 148 (2d CiT. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that the Tax Court applied the
correct legal standard and its determination that the easement had no value was well
supported by the facts).
II See, e.g." William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309-15 (1972) ("In the case of many charitable contributions the material
goods or services purchased with the contributed funds inure entirely to the benefit of
persons other than the donor, and the donor enjoys only the nonmaterial satisfaction of
making a gift .... A good argument can be made that taxable personal consumption should
be defined to include divisible, private goods and services whose consumption by one
household precludes enjoyment by others, but not collective goods whose enjoyment is
nonpreclusive or the nonmaterial satisfactions that arise from making contributions."). See
generally, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Reforming the Charitable Contribution Substantiation Rules,
14 FLA. TAX REV. 275, 279 (2013); Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable
Deductions, 84 IND. LJ. 1047 (2009); Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case of the Taxpaying Good
Samaritan: Deducting Earmarked Transfers to Charity under Federal Income Tax Law,
Theory, and Policy, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243 (2002); Roger Colvinaux, Rationale and
Changing the Charitable Deduction, 138 TAX NOTES 1453, 1455 (Mar. 25, 2013) ("Yet
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charitable split interest 1969 refonns 12 were focused on ensuring that the
amounts that taxpayers deducted matched the amounts that the charities
received. Besides the matching goal of the 1969 provisions,13 in order to
detennine whether the overall effect of a transfer produces a positive net
contribution to the public good, I propose inserting an additional factor into
that calculus - the amount of loss in the federal fisc due to the high
enforcement expenditures caused by almost unifonnly overvalued fa9ade

another reason for the [charitable] deduction IS that it uniquely allows taxpayers to allocate
what would otherwise be public funds."); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts,
Gafls, and Gefls ": The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable
"Gifts" and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts From Income, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441 (2003); David Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39
CONN. L. REV. 531, 545-66 (2006). Some scholars have criticized the charitable deduction
and have argued for the use of direct government subsidies instead. See, e.g., Paul R.
McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable ContributIOns: A Substitute for the
Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377-78 (1972) (In order to eliminate tax inequity and
the bias in favor of the wealthy, " ... we should substitute for the charitable deduction a
system of direct federal assistance for private charitable organizations through a matching
grant mechanism. ").
12 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201,83 Stat. 526-62 (1969). In
1969, Congress significantly reformed the charitable deduction and enacted split interest
rules to combat valuation abuses where the taxpayer's deduction exceeded the amount the
chanty received. See S. REP. No. 91-522, at 86-88 (1969) ("The rules of present law for
determining the amount of a charitable contribution deduction in the case of gifts of
remainder interests in trust do not necessarily have any relation to the value of the benefit
which the charity receives. This is because the trust assets may be invested in a manner so as
to maximize the income interest with the result that there is little relation between the
interest assumptions used in calculating present values and the amount received by the
charity. ").

13 With regard to conservatIOn easements, some scholars have questioned whether
even that goal is satisfied. See Daniel Halperin, A Better Way to Encourage Gifts of
Conservation Easements, 136 TAX NOTES 307, 310 (July 16, 2012) ("Because of the
uniqueness of each encumbered property, the variability in easement restrictions, and paucity
of easement sales, comparable sales (purchases of similar easements on closely similar
properties) would be rare. Therefore, focus is on the supposed decline in the property value
for the donor resulting from the imposition of the restriction .... Not only is the decline in
value difficult to measure, but the approach itself is faulty. Importantly, we have no evidence
that the public benefit is equal to the estimated decline in selling price." (citation
omitted)). This article presents a "shelf project" proposal, one that is part of a larger
inventory of tax reform proposals. See Calvin Johnson, The Shelf Project: Revenue Raising
Proposals to Defend the Tax Base, http://www.utexas.edullaw/faculty/calvinjohnson/
shelf.JlrojecUnventory_subject_matter.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014); see also Roger
Cohnvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 263 (2013); Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tar Expenditure: In
Search of Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 6 (2012) [hereinafter Colinvaux,
Conservation Value].
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easement donations. 14 Because of the inherent and persistent abuses of
overvaluation 15 and of the mounting costs of constant government

14 See David van den Berg, IRS Scrutinizing Conservation Easements, 137 TAX NOTES
19 (Oct. I, 2012); IRS News Release, IR-20I4-3I, IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing
Facade Easements for Federal Tax Purposes for Five Years (Mar. 19, 2014) [hereinafter
2014 IRS News Release], available at http://www.irs.gov/uaclNewsroomIIRS-BarsAppraisers-from- Valuing-Facade-Easements-for-Federal-Tax-Purposes-for-Five-Years); IRS
Notice 2004-41, 2004-1 e.B. 31 (Jun. 30, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 IRS Notice] (informing
taxpayers of increased scrutiny of fayade easement deductions); Richard Rubin, IRS Cracks
Down on Breaks in Land of Rich Americans, BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20 I 3- I I -06/irs-cracks-down-on-breaks-in-Iand-of-richamericans.html ("In this case and dozens like it, the IRS is challenging a complex and
obscure tax break that benefits some of the nation's wealthiest property owners."). In RERI
Holdings I v. CommiSSIOner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488, slip op. at 9 (T.e. 2014), available at
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/ReriHoldingsMemo.Halpern.TCM.WPD.pdf, the
Tax Court described an economic sham. In certain respects, over-valued fayade easement
deductions that do not change taxpayer behavior are "economic shams." ("Generally
speaking, the term 'economic sham' (as opposed to the term 'factual sham', i.e., a
transaction that did not occur) describes a transaction that actually occurred but that exploits
a feature of the Internal Revenue Code without any attendant economic risk." Id.) Because
the taxpayer's property enjoyment is barely impinged and is coupled with a very large tax
benefit, fayade easement donations also commonly evidence a lack of the donative intent, as
required by United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986) ("The sine
qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate
consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely
contributed money or property in excess of the value of any benefit he received in return.").
In American Bar Endowment, the Court rejected a charitable deduction allowance for the socalled donation to the organization when bar members purchased insurance because the
insurance premiums were consistent with market value costs and the members' purchase of
insurance was intended to and did serve their own private interests; by their "donations," the
bar members did not indicate a desire to benefit the bar association's charitable works. When
a deduction creates a consequence (increased property value) that destroys the rationale for
that deduction (to compensate the land owner for his loss in value), and does not appreciably
add to the public good, it tamts "the motivations of those who would have otherwise donated
exclusively out of a sense of altruism." Id.; see Emad H. Atiq, Note, Why Motives Maller:
Reframing the Crowding Out EjJect of Legal Incentives, 123 YALE LJ. 1070, 1098 (2014)
("Those habituated into thinking of charitable donations as a means for personal gain may
fail to cultivate ideal levels of generosity and good will or, alternatively, cheapen their mode
of relating to their beneficiaries."). However, the fact that many taxpayers are motivated to
make charitable deductions at least in part to enjoy the tax benefit of the deduction is not at
issue. "If the motivation to receive a tax benefit deprived a gift of its charitable nature under
section 170, virtually no charitable gifts would be deductible." RERI Holdings 1,107 T.e.M.
(CCH) slip op. at 13 (citing Scheidelman v. Commissioner (Scheidelman II), 682 F. 3d 189,
200 (2d Cir. 2012), remanded to 105 T.C.M.(CCH) 1117 (T.C. 2013), ajJ'd, 755 F.3d 148
(2d Clr. 2014)).
15 See Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: DeSign Flaws, Enforcement
Challenges, and Reform, 3 UTAH L. REV. 755, 765-66 (2013) [hereinafter Colinvaux,
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oversight,16 the fa~ade easement deduction has become counterproductive.
When the broader calculus approach I have suggested is applied, it is clear
that fa~ade easement donations serve private purposes and expend public
funds to a greater degree than they foster the public good. Fa~ade easements
typically allow property owners to maintain or raise property values just as
homeowners' association rules do in many communities nationwide.
Historically accurate fa~ades typically maintain or increase the value of
those buildings because the property becomes more desirable real estate.
Also, fa~ade easements generally do not reduce valuation because local law
restrictions already impose adequate limitations to preserve the historic
fa~ades of the buildings 17 and, because the restrictions only apply to the
fa~ade of the building, the use limitations on the total square footage of the
18
building are slight.
Finally, repeal is not only warranted but overdue. In 2005, the Joint
Committee on Taxation recommended fa<;ade easement repeal at least on
property where the owner or his family had a personal residence. 19 Even
with additional strictures enacted in the PP A, which does not include the
Joint Committee's proposal, fa<;ade easements remain rampant with abuse.
Many scholars have criticized the abuse, which they would like to eliminate
or at least minimize, 20 but only one, Professor Daniel Halperin,21 has called

Easement Reform] ("Unfortunately, the lost economic development value bears no relation
to the conservation value of the easement, meaning that the appraised fair market value does
not provide a proxy for the public benefit of the contribution." (citations omitted)); Halperin,
supra note 13, at 308-11.
16 See Colinvaux, Easement Reform, supra note 15, at 771 ("The result is that
valuation uncertainties can be used to benefit donors, often for questionable conservation
benefits, and the IRS does not have the enforcement tools it needs, leaving it to fight
valuation battles that ultimately provide little to no sense of the public benefit provided.");
Halperin, supra note 13, at 308-11.
17 See infra Part lILA.
18 See Scheidelman v. Commissioner (Scheidelman lIf), 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, slip
op. at 19 (T.C. 2013), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHistoric/Scheidelman
Memo.TCM.WPD.pdf (the government's expert "concluded that because only the facade
was affected by the easement and the loss of utility was only to the facade, the restrictIOns
would not have a material effect on the market value of the whole property."), ajJ'd, 755
F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Even with the Pension Protection Act (PPA), which
requires restrictions to apply to all exterior sides of the structure, there is no limitation
applicable to the inside of the building. See infra Part IV.
19 2005 JOINT COMM. FA<;:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 282-87; see 2005
FGI;:ade Easement Hearings, supra note 5 (including in the record, without objection, the
opening Statement of the Honorable John Lewis despite Lewis' absence from the hearing).
20 See, e.g., Colinvaux, Easement Reform, supra note 15, at 767-71 (suggesting the
need for comprehensive reform); Colinvaux, Conservation Value, supra note 13 (arguing to
retain a tax benefit, but proposing either one geared to the value of the pre-easement property
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for the repeal of fayade easements. While there may be a desire to retain a
tax benefit with purported charitable aims, the long history of unbridled
abuse even with repeated legislative and administrative response should
make it clear that amending the fayade easement deduction is an unending
proposition. The costs, the few very wealthy direct beneficiaries of this
subsidy, and the questionable industries that are indirectly supported by this
22
deduction should tell even the most sanguine that repeal is the only
reasonable action for Congress to take at this time.
I. So FEW, CLAIMING So MUCH

While
small, the
deductions
charitable
easements

the number of taxpayers seeking a fayade deduction is relatively
deductions claimed are large and the taxpayers claiming the
are most often very wealthy. In 2009, of all individual noncash
donations, conservation easements ($483,522) and fayade
($477,225) constituted "the highest average deduction per

or to a variable tax credit that would match the conservation benefit of the easement); Nancy
A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What Have We
Learned and Where Should We Go from Here? 3 UTAH L. REV. 688, 722 (2013) (desiring
comprehensive statutory and regulatory reforms, possibly modeled on the reforms made in
some New England states and California, but observing that the current state of the
conservation easement looks like "a grand and hopeful experiment, but one that ultimately
could prove to be unsuccessful."); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and Amending TaxDeductible Conservation Easements: Protecting the Federal investment After Carpenter,
Simmons, and Kaufman, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 217 (2012) (seeking clear Service or statutory
guidance harmonious with the legislative purpose behind conservation easements).
21 See Halperin, supra note 13, at 311-13 (proposing more broadly that all
conservation easement deductions, as well as the estate tax exclusion of section 2031 (c), be
repealed and replaced by a targeted spending program); Daniel Halperin, incentives for
Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better Way, 74 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 29, 45-47 (2011). However, one non-tax scholar whose principal message on
conservation easements is to eliminate the perpetuity reqUirement, stated: "Beyond the
questions of proper valuation and justifiable conservation values attained, allowing a tax
deduction for conservatIOn easements may not be the best use of public funds. Even with
adequately conserved land, providing a public benefit, and properly assessed according to
the IRS's calculation instructions, conservation easements may not be the best choice for
land preservation. Depending on the loss of tax revenues, it may be more economically
efficient to collect the taxes and use the money to purchase land in fee. (citation omitted)."
Jessica Owley, Changmg Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 121, ISO-51 (2011).
22 Fa9ade easements support charities that monitor their compliance. Those charities
often require the easement donors to make cash donations equal to a certain percentage
(generally ten percent) of the value of their easements for that work. This practice in tum
often encourages the charity's acquiescence to an easement donation's overvaluation. See
infra notes 37,125, and text discussion in Kaufman 111 in Part 1II.e.
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return." Both were close to one-half million dollars per return. 23 For
comparison, the average donation of stock per return was $86,186 in that
24
same year.
TABLE

1. INDIVIDUAL CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF F A<;:ADE
25
EASEMENTS FROM 2005 TO 2009

YEAR

NUMBER OF
RETURNS

NUMBER OF
DONATIONS

AVERAGE
AMOUNT PER
RETURN

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

1,028
1,143
228
1,180
94

1,132
1,145
242
1,396
103

299,080
231,572
974,779
32,462
477,225

TABLE 2. INDIVIDUAL CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CORPORATE
26
STOCK FROM 2005 TO 2009

YEAR

NUMBER OF
RETURNS

NUMBER OF
DONATIONS

AVERAGE
AMOUNT PER
RETURN

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

181,192
187,325
202,019
123,510
112,852

339,828
429,139
450,824
268,344
231,171

90,162
122,745
117,458
99,912
86,186

At least some of the differences in both fayade easement and corporate
stock donations in 2007 and 2008 could be attributed to the economic
. m
. 2008 ,27a f'C'
.
28 stoc k
'
29
lectmg rea I estate pnces,
pnces,
downturn occurnng
23
24

2009 Noncash Donations, supra note 3.
Id.

25 The data are derived from Form 8283. See Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash
Contributions, 2005, 27 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 68, 69 (2008). Pearson Liddell & Janette
Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2006, 29 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 67, 68 (2009
Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2007, 29 STAT. OF
INCOME BULL. 52, 53 (2010) [hereinafter 2007 Noncash Donations Pearson Liddell &
Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2008, 30 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 76, 77
(201 I); 2009 Noncash Donations, supra note 3.
26 See sources cited supra note 25.
27 For the fact and contributing causes of the 2008 financial crisis, see, for example,
Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.coml2011/0I/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html?_r=0;
Steve
Denning, Lest We Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com!sites/stevedenning/2011l11/22/5086/; Larry Elliott, Global Financial
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and charitable giving generally.3o However, the results for fas;ade easements
appear to be anomalies, but it is impossible to determine the causes
because, with so few donors, further inquiries run into prohibited identity
disclosures of individual taxpayers. 3] Ignoring those years as outliers, the
number of fas;ade easement donors IS small and the claimed donation IS
large.
Although one of the only two types of noncash charitable gifts that
increased in 2009, from $0.38 billion in 2008 to $0.45 billion in 2009, the
number of taxpayers claiming deductions for fas;ade easement contributions
decreased. In 2009, there were only ninety-four returns claiming the fas;ade
easement deduction, as compared to 112,852 returns claiming deductions
32
for corporate stock.
To underline how few taxpayers benefit from the fas;ade easement
charitable deduction, the 2010 and 2011 Internal Revenue Service (Service)
statistics for noncash charitable deductions combine all conservation
easements into one category. According to the senior analyst preparing this
data, there are insufficient data to segregate the statistics for each
subcategory, such as fas;ade easements, and therefore to disclose that
specific information "would constitute an unlawful disclosure of individual
taxpayer data and therefore could not be provided.,,33 In 2010, there were
2,933 returns claiming charitable contributions of all types of conservation
easements including fas;ade easement donations;34 in 2011, there were a
total of 1,813 conservation easement returns?5 Again, their numbers pale in

Crisis: Five Key Stages 2007-2011, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.
theguardian.comlbusiness/20 II/aug/07 /global-financial-crisis-key-stages ("It took a year for
the financial crisis to come to a head but it did so on 15 September 2008 when the US
government allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt.").
28 Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble and the FinancIGI Crisis, 46 REAL-WORLD ECON.
REV. 73, 74-75 (20 II), available at http://paecon.netiPAERevlew/issue46/Baker46.pdf.
29 Gerald P. Dwyer, Stock Prices in the Financial Crisis, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
ATLANTA
(September
2009),
http://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/pubscf/stock-prices_
infinancial_crisis.cfm ("Stock prices fell roughly 50 percent from peak to trough from
October 2007 to March 2009.").
30 See SARA K. GOULD, FOUND. CENTER, DIMINISHING DOLLARS: THE IMPACT OF THE
2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE FIELD OF SOCIAL JUSTICE PHILANTHROPY (2011), available at
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/researchlpdf/diminishing_dollars20 I I.pdf.
31 See infra note 33.
32

2009 Noncash Donations, supra note 3.

See E-mail from Ruth Schwartz, Statistics of Income Div., Internal Revenue
Service, to author (June 4,2014) (on file with author).
34 Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2010, 32
STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 64 (2013) [hereinafter 2010 Noncash Donations].
35 See Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2011, 33
33
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relation to the number of returns claiming corporate stock donations for
37
36
those years: 123,109 returns in 2010 and 112,094 returns in 2011.
Because the value of a fayade easement represents a small fraction of
the value of the encumbered property before the creation of the easement,
the underlying property values are likely to be many times the value of the
deduction-that means that by retaining the fayade easement deduction,
38
Congress is benefiting a small number of multi-millionaires. That is, by
means of the fayade easement deduction, Congress is giving alms to very
wealthy property owners and is not meaningfully providing for the public
good.
II. THE FA<;ADE EASEMENT CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

The income tax conservation easement deduction is provided for by
section 170(h) and is further explained in Treasury Regulation section
39
1. 170A-14. For the donated land interest to qualify as serving exclusively

STAT. OF INCOME BULL. I II (2014) [hereinafter 2011 Noncash Donations].
36

2010 Noncash Donations, supra note 34.

2011 Noncash Donations, supra note 35.
38 Because most hIstoric structures are subject to local restrictions, the easement's
actual value is likely to be minimal or zero; however, as case law indicates many of the
easements were not properly valued but were valued by mUltiplying the value of the property
without the easement by a fixed percentage of between II and 12.5 percent. See infra note
131; see also Rothman v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1864 (T.C. 2012), vacated in
part, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 126 (T.C. 2012) (holding on reconsideration that the taxpayer's
appraisal "still fails to satisfy 8 of 15 requirements" for a qualified appraisal). Thus, if the
average fa.;ade deduction is $300,000, by that improper valuation method but often used
percentage, the value of the historic home is somewhere between $2.4M and $2,727,273
(i.e., $300,000 divided respectively by .125 and by .11).
39 I.R.C. § 2031(c)(8)(B) provides an estate tax exclusion for qualified conservation
easements, but that exclusion of estate tax value is not available to fa.;ade easements. This
estate tax provision identifies those easements with reference to the definition of "a qualified
conservation contribution (as defined in section 170(h)(1) ofa qualified real property interest
(as defined in section 170(h)(2)(C)), except that clause (iv) of section 170(h)(4)(A) shall not
apply, and the restriction on the use of such interest described in section l70(h)(2)(C) shall
include a prohibition on more than a de minimis use for a commercial recreational activity."
(emphasis added)). The I.R.C. § 2031(c) conservation easement exclusion was enacted as
part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 105-34, § 508(a). If the executor so elects, the
estate may exclude the lesser of a maximum of forty percent of the value of the land subject
to the qualified conservation easement, reduced by any amount of estate tax charitable
deduction claimed under I.R.C. § 2055(f) for the same land, or $500,000 from the value of
decedent's gross estate. That provIsion was amended by the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of2001, P.L. 107-16, § 551(a), amending I.R.C. §§ 2031 (c)(2) and
(c )(8), removing most of the geographical limitations of the statute. Before the 200 I act, the
exclusion was restricted to land located close to a metropolitan area, national park,
37
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conservation purposes, it must satisfy the requirements of both subsections
l70(h)(4) and l70(h)(5).4o Gift and estate tax deductions are allowable

wilderness area, or urban national forest; with the 2001 amendment, the exclusion is
available to conservation easements attached to any land within the United States or a u.S.
possession.
40 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) provides:
(A)ln general. - For purposes of this subsection, the term "conservation
purpose" means - (i) the preservation ofland areas for outdoor recreation by, or
the education of, the general public, (ii) the protection of a relatively natural
habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem, (iii) the preservation of
open space (Including farmland and forest land) where such preservation is - (I)
for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or (II) pursuant to a clearly
delineated Federal, State, or local governmental conservation policy, and will
yield a significant public benefit, or (iv) the preservation of an historically
important land area or a certified historic structure.
(C)Certified historic structure - For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iv), the term
"certified historic structure" means any building, structure, or land area which
(i) is listed in the National Register, or
(ii) is located in a registered historic district (as defined in section 47(c)(3)(8))
and is certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary as being of
historic significance to the district.
A building, structure, or land area satisfies the preceding sentence if it satisfies
such sentence either at the time of the transfer or on the due date (including
extensions) for filing the transferor's return under this chapter for the taxable year
in which the transfer is made.
I.R.C. § 170(h)(5) provides:
Exclusively for conservation purposes -

For purposes of this subsection-

Conservation purpose must be protected - A contnbution shall not be treated as
exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is
protected in perpetuity.
No surface mining permitted In general - Except as provided in clause (ii), in the case of a contribution of any
interest where there IS a retention of a qualified mineral interest, subparagraph
(A) shaH not be treated as met if at any time there may be extraction or removal
of minerals by any surface mining method.
Special rule - With respect to any contribution of property in which the
ownership of the surface estate and mineral interests has been and remains
separated, subparagraph (A) shaH be treated as met if the probability of surface
mining occurring on such property is so remote as to be negligible.
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under sections 2S22(d) and 20SS(f), respectively.41
Congress enacted and has maintained the deduction to reimburse
owners of historic buildings for the additional cost incurred in maintaining
and insuring the buildings and to recompense the owners for the loss in
42
property value due to their restricted use. Nowadays, many communities
have homeowners' associations that restrict an owner's property usage in
order to maintain or increase property values in that community.43 Congress
44
likewise enacted a rehabilitation credit to renovate these structures.
All of the conservation easement Internal Revenue Code (Code)
provisions provide exceptions to the general rule that donations that contain
45
both charitable and noncharitable interests are nondeductible. Indeed,
because of the opportunities for abusive shifting of benefits to the
noncharitable beneficiary, Congress, the courts, and scholars have
continually acknowledged the potential for and existence of abuse with

41 I.R.C. § 2522(d) provides: "A deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) in
respect of any transfer of a qualified real property interest (as defined in section
170(h)(2)(C)) which meets the requirements of section 170(h) (without regard to paragraph
(4)(A) thereol)." I.R.C. § 2055(1) provides for an identical description of the deduction for
estate tax purposes.

42

See, e.g., Federal Hlstonc Preservation Tax Incentives Program (1976). However,

the initial legislation lacked clarity in its requirements. See Glass v. Commissioner, 124 T.C.
258, 279 n.16 (2005) ("Congress did not in the TRA 1976 define (or indicate the meaning
01) either the word 'exclusively' or the term 'exclusively for conservation purposes.' Nor
does the legislative history of the TRA 1976 shed any light on the meaning of that word or
that term."). Likewise, the statute is not particularly helpful in explaining the "exclusively
for conservation purposes" requirement. "The statute contains no further specific guidance as
to when a contribution of a qualified real property interest that IS protected in perpetuity will
be exclusively for conservation purposes." ld. at 277. However, the court in Glass did find
some assistance III subsequent tax legislation. According to the conference report for the Tax
Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977: "it is intended that a contributIOn of a
conservation easement * * * qualify for a deductIOn only if the holding of the easement * * *
is related to the purpose or function constituting the donee's purpose for exemption * * * and
the donee is able to enforce its rights as holder of the easement***and protect the
conservation purposes which the contribution is intended to advance. The requirement that
the contribution be exclusively for conservation purposes is also intended to limit deductible
contributions to those transfers which require that the donee hold the easement * * *
exclusively for conservation purposes (i.e., that they not be transferable by the donee in
exchange for money, other property, or services)." H.R. REP. 95-263, at 30-31 (1977) (Conf.
Rep.), cited in Glass at 279.
43 Today, many homes are purchased in developments with community homeowners
rules. See supra note 7. Moreover, zoning has traditionally restricted area usage. See Bradley
C. Karkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45 (1994).
44

See I.R.C. § 47.

For the prohibition against split interest gifts, see I.R.C. § 170(1)(3), specifically
I.R.C. § 170(1)(3)(B)(iii) for the exception of conservation easements to this rule.
45
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··mterest trans Iiers. 46
regard to sp1It

III.

THE ABUSES: REVIEW OF RECENT CASE LAW

A. Overvaluation and Questionable Devaluation
With favade easements, overvaluation and inaccurate appraisals are
47
endemic. The Service issued Notice 2004-41 to notify both donors and
charities that the government was going to scrutinize conservation
easements and not only deny deductions, but also, where warranted, to
impose penalties and excise taxes and revoke a charity's tax exempt status.
According to the Service, however, abuses relating to favade easements
. 48
persIst.
Scholars and the courts have appreciated the difficulty in valuing split
interest property donations that provide a benefit not only to the charity but
also to the donor. With conservation easements that require the donee to
monitor and enforce the easement in perpetuity, the quid pro quo value of
49
the donation is even more difficult to calculate. Favade easement charities
typically require a cash donation equal to a percentage of the value of the
donated easement. That practice, according to some courts, contributes to
46 See, e.g., Turner v. Commissioner, 126 T.e. 299, 317 (2006) (citing S. REP. No. 961007, at 9-10 (1980) ("[T]he committee believes that provisions allowing deductions for
conservatIOn easements should be directed at the preservation of unique or otherwise
sIgnificant land areas or structures * * * the committee bill would restrict the qualifying
contributions where there is no assurance that the public benefit, if any, furthered by the
contribution would be substantial enough to justify the allowance of a deduction. * * *")).

47 2004 IRS Notice, supra note 14 ("This notice informs taxpayers that the Service
will, in appropriate cases, reduce or disallow deductions claimed by taxpayers under section
170 of the Code for transfers in connection with conservation easements. This notice also
informs participants in these transactIOns that they may be subject to other adverse tax
consequences, including penalties, excise taxes, and loss of tax-exempt status, as
appropriate.").
48 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Conservation Easements, IRS.GOV (Apr. 17,
2014), http://www .irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Conservation-Easements
("Another
problem arises in connection with historic easements, particularly fac,:ade easements. Here
again, some taxpayers are taking improperly large deductions. They agree not to modIfy the
fac,:ade of their historic house and they give an easement to this effect to a charity. However,
if the fac,:ade was already subject to restrictions under local zoning ordinances, the taxpayers
may, in fact, be giving up nothing, or very little. A taxpayer cannot give up a right that he or
she does not have."); 2014 IRS News Release, supra note 14.
49 Halperin, supra note 13, at 311 ("Donors maybe giving up very little, particularly
because the burden on a donor depends on the holder's monitoring and enforcing the use
restrictions over the long term. Also, an easement's benefit to the public may be much less
than the purported loss to the donor. The professional staffs of the JCT and the Senate
Finance Committee expressed similar reservations in 2005." (citations omitted)).
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the easement itself being overvalued: the charity that gains more from a
higher valuation is not likely to question even a conspicuously large
easement value. 50
In Friedberg, 51 a 2013 fa«;:ade easement case involving tax year 2003
and a claimed deduction of $3,775,000,52 the taxpayer's appraiser listed
among "downward" factors of a fayade easement full development loss,
possibly more maintenance costs, no choice or change in the building
exterior, and the fact that future owners would not be able to benefit taxwise from adding a fa«;:ade easement to the property. 53
In Gorra,54 a 2013 case involving a fa~ade charitable deduction in tax
years 2006 and 2007,55 even where the court agreed that the taxpayers'
easement was more restrictive than local law and served a valid
conservation purpose in perpetuity, the court reduced the taxpayers'
claimed easement value of $605,000 to $104.000, which represents
approximately an eighty-three percent reduction in valuation. As such, the
56
easement created only a two percent diminution of the building'S value.

50

See supra note 22; infra Part III.e. Kaufman III and accompanying notes.

51 Friedberg v. Commissioner (Friedberg II), 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 360 (T.C. 2013),
supplementing Friedberg 1, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 356 (T.C. 2011) (granting the government
summary judgment on the basis that the taxpayers' appraisal, which applied a percentage
diminution rather than the required "before and after" valuation method and which
considered property outside of New York City, was not a qualified one). The court granted
the taxpayers summary judgment on their motion for reconsideration in light of Scheidel man
v. Commissioner (Scheidelman II), 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012). The second circuit in
Scheidelman Il held that the regulation dealing with an appraisal's identification of his
valuation method only reqUIres that he report that method, and not that there be an adequate
basis for or reasonable use of that method. Scheidelman II at 196-97. The Friedberg 11 court
held that the taxpayers' expert's appraisal was a qualified one prepared by a qualified
appraiser under Scheidelman Il because it "includes a specific basis for [the appraiser's]
valuation .... However, we specifically do not opine on the reliability and accuracy of the
methodology and specific basis of valuatIOn in the [taxpayer's appraiser's] appraisal, a
matter we leave to be decided at trial." Friedberg 11, slip op. at 8.
52 Friedberg Il, slip op. at 5. The taxpayers made a required $350,000 cash
contribution to monitor the property. Id. slip op. at I.
53 Id. slip op. at 4.

54

Gorra v. CommiSSIOner, 106 T.C.M. (CHH) 523 (2013).

55 ld. (The 2007 deduction related to the 2006 fa~ade easement contribution, which,
because of the percentage limitations in I.R.C. § 170(b) on current year deductibility, had to
be carried over as a deduction into the followmg year).
56 The taxpayer also made a $45,000 cash contribution to cover mOnItoring costs as
required by the charity. !d. slip op. at 2. In 2009, the charity allowed the taxpayers to add a
retractable awning to the building'S fayade because it "determined that the awning was
consistent with the historical character of the property." ld. slip op. at 6.
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The court thereby imposed a gross valuation penalty57 under such
circumstances, resulting in a forty percent penalty on the portion of the
underpayment attributable to the gross valuation misstatement.
Most of the homes involved are already subject to local building
restrictions. Thus, taxpayers who purchased their homes in a historic district
bought them with concomitant expectations of maintaining historic fayade
easements. Moreover, those restrictions were imposed to maintain and
improve property values. In Scheidelman, the court held that the taxpayers'
easement had zero value because the easement echoed local restrictions.
Likewise, in 1982 East, the court did not find that the easement provided
any "additional meaningful protection not already guaranteed by the LPCs
enforcement of local law.,,58 Indeed, in that case, the bank mortgagee
checked to ascertain that the collateral value of the building would not be
affected by the imposition of the easement and "concluded that it would
not.,,59 The taxpayers' experts in Dunlap60 did not explain how the
charitable easement was more restrictive than the regulations imposed by
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission.
Similarly, recently in Chandler,61 the South End Landmark District
Commission (SELDC) already regulated the two properties subject to
fayade easements.
"The SELDC's powers closely approximate [the
charity's] powers under the easement agreements with some exceptions.,,62
The court held that the taxpayers' expert's appraisal was totally unreliable.
57

I.R.C. § 6661(h).

58 1982 East, LLC v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380, slip op. at 10 (2011),
available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/inOpHistoricI1982EastLLC.TCM.WPD.pdf ("Thus
it is local law and the rules of the LPC that preserve the subject property and not the rights
which [the charity] possessed under the deed of easement.").
59 Id. slip op. at 4.
60 Dunlap v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CHH) 1689 (T.C. 2012) (This case is a
consolidated case with taxpayers who owned units in the Cobblestone Loft Condominium
(Cobblestone), which is located in a historic district in New York City, and who granted
far;ade easements to the same charity); see Wendy C. Gerzog, Fat;ade Easement: Inexpert
ValuatIOn, 136 Tax Notes 199 (July 9, 2012). in Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street LLC v.
Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1599 (T.C. 2014), although the court did not need to
decide this issue because it held that the taxpayer had not proved that it had transferred a
greater value for its interior and exterior easement grants than the property it received in
return, the taxpayer had claimed a $7,150,000 charitable deduction for property already
subject to some exterior restrictions by the Denver Landmark Preservation Commission.
61 Chandler v. Commissioner, 142 T.C.M. (CCH) 16 (2014), aVa/lable at http://
www.ustaxcourt.gov/inOpHistoric/ChandlerDiv.Goeke.TC.WPD.pdf.
62 Id. slip op. at 6. Those exceptions included that the local law restrictions only
covered construction publicly visible, they relied on public complaints for violatIOn
notification, and they contained an exemption from enforcement for owners who could show
that they would thereby encounter significant financial hardship. Id
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The encumbered property was located in or near Boston, but the appraiser
63
used "comparables" from New York City and New Orleans ; the sample
was too small; the New Orleans valuation was based on a settlement
amount when the buyer discovered that the property sold was encumbered
by an easement; only one of the four Boston property appraisals was not
"seriously flawed"; and the appraiser made subjective adjustments that the
64
court dismissed as unhelpfu1. Significantly, however, while the appraiser
determined that one data point property sold for between 12.8% and 18.5%
less than two other properties because of the differences in their
encumbrances, the court found that the deed of that property contained
substantially similar limitations to the other property's easements.
According to the court, "This indicates that the difference in price resulted
from some other factor that [the appraiser] did not consider. This error
undermines [the appraiser's] credibility concermng not only this
comparison, but the entire report. ,,65
At the same time, the court rejected the government's appraisal that
6
showed an appreciation in value in Boston encumbered propertl after the
easements were granted because it did not specify how much of that
increase was due to renovations property owners had made. Although the
taxpayers pointed to distinctions between the easement and local law
limitations, the court held that, like in Kaufman IV, those differences were
not likely to be meaningful to a buyer. Rejecting the taxpayers' appraisal
report in its totality as not credible, the court held that the taxpayers had not
proved any value for their fayade easement contribution.
Despite that the properties were already subject to local rules and
regulations requiring them to maintain the historic features of their house,

63 The court considered the out of state easements unpersuasive. Jd. slip op. at 12
("The values of easements In other markets tell us little about easement values in Boston's
unique market.").

64 The taxpayers' appraIser made major adjustments based on his own subjective rating
of the properties' condition. "Because of these significant subjective adjustments, [the
appraiser's] conclusions flowing from these comparisons largely reflect his opinion rather
than the objective market values of the easements. When an appraiser makes numerous
adjustments to a subject property's comparables, the subject property's valuation becomes
less reliable." Jd. slip op. at 14. The taxpayers' appraiser's report also had procedural
mistakes. "He calculated the easement values by dividing the difference in sale prices by the
encumbered property's price. He then applied that percentage to the before value of
petitioners' properties to calculate the easement values. He should have divided the
difference in sale prices by the unencumbered property's sale price. We have adjusted the
data in his report to account for this error." Jd. slip op. at 11 n.3.
65 Id. slip op. at 15.
66 Id. slip op. at 15-16 ("Mr. Bowman selected nine recently encumbered Boston
properties that sold between 2005 and 2011.").
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the easement values for which the taxpayers had claimed charitable
deductions were very large: 61 York Acquisition, LLC, $10,730,000
(partnership level deduction);671982 East, $6,570,000 (partnership level
deduction);68Carpenter, $385,600;69 Chandler, $191,400 (the Claremont
70
property easement) and $371,250 (the West Newton easement); Dunlap,
$237,000;71 Friedberg, $3,775,000;72 Gorra, $605,000;73 Graev,
$990,000;74
McSweens,
$2,210,464;75
Scheidelman,
$115,000;76
Schrimsher, $705,000;77 Simmons, $162,500 (Logan Circle) and $93,000
(Vermont Avenue),78 and Van Wyhe, $801,121. 79

61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-266, 2013 Tax. Ct.
Memo. LEXIS 274 (T.C. 2013) (Despite its fayade easement deduction claim, the court
disallowed any deduction on the ground that because the partnership owned only the first
fourteen levels of a twenty story building, it could not satisfy the statutory requirement that
its grant of a fayade easement restrict the entire exterior of the historic structure as required
under I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)).
68 1982 East, LLC v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380 (T.C. 2011), available
at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHlstoric/1982EastLLC.TCM.WPD.pdf.
67

69 Carpenter v. Commissioner, 103 T.e.M. (CCH) 1001 (T.e. 2012). Carpenter was a
consolidated case, involving other taxpayers with substantially similar facts. Carpenter
claimed a deduction on her 2004 return; Van Wyhe, partly on his 2004 return with
carryovers on his 2005 and 2006 returns; the McSweens, partly on their 2003 and 2004
returns, with carryovers on their 2004 and 2005 returns. See I.R.e. § 170(b).
70 The Chandlers deducted a part of this amount over three tax years (2004-2006). See
I.R.e. § 170(b).
71 This figure represents the Dunlaps' claimed fayade easement deduction (i.e., their
share of the total Cobblestone easement appraised value of $8,171,000).
72

Friedberg v. Commissioner (Friedberg I), 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 356 (T.C. 2011).

73

Gorra v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CHH) 523, slip op. at 15-16 (2013).

74

Graev v. Commissioner, 140 T.e. 377, 384 (2013).

75

The McSweens were taxpayers in the consolidated Carpenter case. See supra note

69.
76 Scheidelman v. CommIssioner (Scheidelman I), 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, slip op. at II
(T .C. 20 I 0), available at http://www .ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHistoric/Scheidelman. TCM.
WPD.pdf.
77 Schrimsher v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1329 (T.e. 2011) (The taxpayers
deducted $193,180 in 2004 and took carryover deductions of $206,699 in 2005 and $120,724
in 2006. The court denied the fayade easement deduction on the basis that the taxpayers did
not receive a contemporaneous written acknowledgement of their donation as required under
I.R.e. § 170(f)(8)).
78 Simmons v. Commissioner, 98 T.e.M. (CCH) 57924 (T.C. 2009), ajJ'd 646 F.3d 6
(D.C. Cir. 2011). The taxpayer had donated the larger deduction easement in 2003 and the
other easement in 2004, taking the full deduction respectively in the applicable year. The
Tax Court reduced these easement values to $56,250 (Logan Circle) and $42,250 (Vermont
Avenue).
79 Van Wyhe was a taxpayer in the consolidated Carpenter case. See supra note 69.
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Very recently, in Zarlengo,80 the Tax Court reduced the total value of
the fayade easement deduction claimed from $660,000 to $157,500. Even
though the buyer of the townhouse, who did not know about the easement
when he made an offer of $4,605,500, did not change his offer after he
learned about the easement, the court nevertheless applied a 3.5%
diminution to what the court determined was the townhouse's pre-easement
value of $4.5 million when the easement was recorded in 2005. The court
allowed a 2005 deduction of $78,750 (and any appropriate carryover
deductions for 2006 and 2007) to Ms. Sander-Zarlengo for her one-half
interest in the townhouse because the court held that the applicable local
restrictions, although similar to those under federal law, were less extensive
81
than the federallimitations.
B. As if that weren't enough - if no deduction is allowed, I want that
easement removed from my property and my cash contribution returned to
me!

Fas:ade easement charitable deductions have encouraged an increase in
bogus deductions as a result of the "I'd like to have my cake and eat it too"
mentality that has led to the encouragement of transfers contingent on
receiving the charitable deduction. Both cash required donations (required
by the charity to fund the statutorily imposed duty of monitoring the
easement in perpetuity) and the transferred property interest (the easement
itself) are revocable either by the consent of the parties or in the event of a
denial of the deduction.
In Graev,82 a 2013 case involving tax years 2004 and 2005,83 the court

80

Zarlengo v. Commissioner, 108 T.e.M. (CCH) 155 (T.C. 2014).

The taxpayers, Dr. Zarlengo and his ex-wife Ms. Sander-Zarlengo, each owned onehalf of the encumbered townhouse subject to the fayade easement and each claimed one-half
of the total easement's value as a charitable donation. The court held that under New York
law, a gift of a conservation easement is not complete until it is recorded; here, that
recordation date was January 26, 2005. Also, the court held that the taxpayers had not
satisfied the perpetuity requirement for conservation easements under I.R.C. §§ 170(h)(2)(C)
and 170(h)(5)(A) until that date. Dr. Zarlengo had filed a joint 2004 return with his current
wife in which he claimed his share of the easement deduction; because his 2004 return was
the only return before the court, he was denied any deduction. By contrast, Ms. SanderZarlengo's 2005-2007 returns were all under the court's jurisdiction.
82 Graev v. Commissioner, 140 T.e. 377 (2013); see Wendy e. Gerzog, Graev:
Conditional FQI;:ade Easement, 140 Tax Notes 1607 (Sep. 30, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=2333211.
83 The 2005 deduction was a carryover from the 2004 easement grant due to the
percentage limitations on current deducibility under I.R.e. § 170(b). Graev, 140 T.e. at 387.
81
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disallowed the taxpayers' claimed easement value of $990,000. The
easement grant had a refundable feature whereby the charity agreed to
refund the taxpayers' easement and cash donation. The charity sent a side
letter to the taxpayers explaining their standard policy to refund their
donation if the taxpayers could not receive the promised favorable
charitable deduction. Specifically, the letter promised, "to join with Graev
to immediately remove the favade easement from the property's titie.,,85
The court held that the potential for the Service to disallow those
deductions and for the charity to remove the easement and return the cash to
86
Graev was not so remote as to be negligible. The court stated that by
filing returns with the deductions and failing to remove the refund feature
of their donations, the taxpayers acted in response both to the Service notice
indicating additional scrutiny applicable to overvalued favade easements
and to the charity's second letter warning of the government's disallowance
of a deduction for a favade easement that was coupled with a refund
provision. Thus the court held that the risk of the government's disallowing
the deduction was "well above 'negligible. ",87 According to the court,
Graev required the charity'S letter with the refund feature before making his
contribution. Also, the easement charity understood that a Service
disallowance was more than a remote possibility and that was why it
routinely issued comfort letters to potential donors. Thus, as conditional
donations, the court held that the taxpayers' easement grant and cash
88
donations were nondeductible.
84 Id. at 384. In Graev, the taxpayers also made a required cash contribution of
$99,000. Id. at 385.
85 Id. at 383.
86 Id. at 393 ("Accordingly, a conservation easement fails to be 'in perpetuity' ... if,
on the date of the donation, the possibility that the charity may be divested of its interest in
the easement is not so remote as to be negligIble.").
87 Id. at 397.

88 Id. at 409. One month after Graev, in Carpenter v. Commissioner (Carpenter II),
106 T.e.M. (CCH) 62 (T.e. 2013) available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHistoric/
CarpenterMemo.Haines.TCM.WPO.pdf, the Tax Court wrote a supplemental memorandum
opinion on a motion to reconsider its 2012 memorandum opinion Carpenter v.
Commissioner (Carpenter I), 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001 (T.C. 2012) available at
http://www.ustaxcourt.govlInOpHistoric/CARPENTER.TCM.WPO.pdf, in light of the First
Circuit opinion in Kaufman III. See Kaufman III discussion infra Part III.C,. Although not a
fa~ade easement, this case involved a conservation easement that, under Colorado law, could
be terminated through the parties' mutual consent because state law would not apply the cy
pres doctrine to restricted gifts. As such, the court held Kaufman 11/ to be inapplicable. Thus,
the court denied the taxpayers' motion for reconsideration. Carpenter II, slip op. at 12, 1823; see Wachter v. Commissioner, 142 T.e. No.7, slip op. at 6-7 (Mar. 11,2014), available
at http://www.ustaxcourt.govlInOpHistoric/WachterOiv.Buch.TC.WPO.pdf (The court held
that where the state restricts an easement's duration to a maximum of ninety-nine years, the
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C. Kaufman: Four Opinions Necessary to Show a Valueless Contribution

(Much Ado About Nothing)
1.

Kaufman I

In Kaufman I, 89 the Tax Court granted summary judgment for the
government on the issue of the disallowance of a charitable deduction for
90
the value of the taxpayers' Boston rowhouse fa9ade easement because the
easement was not granted in perpetuity.91 The court held that because the
mortgage on the building gave first preference of proceeds distribution to
the mortgagee rather than to the charity holding the easement, the easement
was not granted in perpetuity.
According to the regulations, when conditions change so that the
perpetual easement is extinguished, the donee organization must be entitled
92
its proportionate share of the proceeds. The taxpayers conceded that if a
casualty occurred, the bank, as mortgagee, had a prior claim to those
funds;93 however, they maintained as a factual matter, in those
circumstances, they would likely have been able to satisfy both the bank
and the charity's claims. The court rejected that reading and stated that the
perpetuity obligation is one that does not encompass probabilities but only
·
94
necessary Iega I reqUirements.

conservation easement does not satisfy the perpetuity requirement of the statute. The "so
remote as to be negligible" exception in the regulations goes to the likelihood that the
property interest will return to the donor, regardless of the length of time it takes for the
reversion to take effect).
89

Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman I), 134 T.C. 182 (2010).

90 The taxpayers had claimed a charitable deduction of $220,800 related to their
easement grant, which because of the income percentage restrictions on current year
deductibility in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1 )(C), had to be partially deducted in the following year,
2004. Kaufman fat 184.
91 See I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C), (5)(A); Treas. Reg. § I. I 70A-14(a), (g)(6)(ii) (2009). The
court denied the government summary judgment on the other two issues: (I) the
deductibility of the conditional cash gift to the charity and (2) the taxpayers' accuracy related
penalty liability under I.R.C. § 6662 because of the presence of genuine issues of material
fact. Kaufman fat 182-84.
92

93

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)(2009).
Kaufman f at 186.

94 ld. at 186-87. Kaufman f can be contrasted with frby v. Commissioner, 139 T.C.
371,382-83 (2012) (where the source of funds for a bargain sale creating the conservation
easement were grants from governmental entities that must use the proceeds "in a manner
consistent with the original conservation purposes of the [donors'] contribution .... ").
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Kaufman II

In Kaufman 11,95 the Tax Court reviewed its partial summary judgment
in favor of the government and decided the two factual issues (the
taxpayers' cash contributions and related penalties) that it had earlier held
could not be decided by summary judgment. The court allowed both parties
to amend their positions on the taxpayers' 2003 and 2004 cash charitable
deductions,96 which in tum caused a reassignment of their respective
burdens of proof. After its amendments, the government bore the burden of
proof regarding the increased deficiency and penalty for 2004 from its
disallowing the $3,032 deduction, and the quid pro quo ground for
disallowing the taxpayers' 2003 $16,840 cash contribution deduction, as it
97
represented new matter for the taxpayers to rebut.
The court in Kaufman 11 reviewed its grant of partial summary
judgment for the government that denied any deduction for the taxpayers'
fas;ade easement contribution because it did not satisfy the perpetuity
98
and was not a qualified
requirements outlined in the regulations
conservation contribution under section 170(h)(I). The taxpayers contended
that the agreement in fact required enforcement in perpetuity as defined in
the regulations. 99 The government maintained that the combination of the
easement and lender agreement did not comply with the extinguishment
"
. hi'
100
provIsIOn
III t e regu atlOns.
The court first cited to the treatise Powell on Real Property wherein
Powell wrote, "a conservation easement may be terminated without the
consent of the holder: through the foreclosure of a pre-existing mortgage or
mechanic's lien on property subsequently encumbered by the easement."IOI
The court then explained that no deduction is permitted for an interest
subject to a mortgage unless the mortgagee subordinates its property rights
95 Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman 11), 136 T.C. 294 (2011); see Wendy C.
Gerzog, Mortgage and Conservation Easements: Not a Good Mix, 132 TAX NOTES 437 (July
25, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1894739.
96 In May 2010, before the trial, petitioners amended their petition, claiming a 2004
deduction of $16,840. In June 2010, after the trial, the government amended its answer to
increase the taxpayers' 2004 deficiency and to assess an accuracy-related penalty. Both
parties agree that the $300 bank fee Kaufman paid to NAT is nondeductible. Kaufman 11 at
314.
97 ld. at 315.
98

See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g) (2009); Kaufman 1 at 187.

Kaufman 11 at 302 (referring to Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(g)(2) and (3)).
100 Kaufman 11 at 302-03 (referring to Income Tax Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)); see Wall
v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1906 (T.e. 2012) (same issue with the same result).
101 Kaufman 11 at 304 (although Powell also explains that public policy considerations
may make the doctrine inapplicable).
99
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to the donee organization's perpetual conservation enforcement obligation.
The court discussed an exception that provides a deduction will not be
disallowed if an event that could defeat the interest from passing to the
charity is only remotely likely to occur. 102 However, the regulations did not
conceive of a mortgage failure as a remote event and the court emphasized
that the charity'S property rights must remain the same even when there are
changed conditions and an extinguishment of the easement. Thus, on a sale,
exchange, or involuntary conversion, the charity must retain its
proportionate share of the proceeds. The court interpreted the
extinguishment regulations to require that "the donee have a right to a share
of the proceeds and not merely a contractual claim against the owner of the
. I
'
prevIOUS
y servient
estate. ,,103
The first of the two new issues in Kaufman II was the deductibility of
the taxpayers' conditional cash contributions to the charity. The charity had
sent a letter to the taxpayers stating that easement donors were required to
contribute a cash endowment to the charity equal to ten percent of the value
of the tax deduction. The letter explained that the cash contribution would
cover the present and future costs of monitoring the donation in
perpetuity.104 In addition, the letter explained that if the taxpayers did not
qualify for a charitable deduction, the donors and the charity would join
together to void the easement and the donors would be reimbursed for their
. I costs an d cash contn'b'
appralsa
utton. 105

102 Id. at 305 (citing Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(g)(l)-(3)). Although the taxpayers
argued the applicability of the regulation's remote and negligible" standard protects against
the possibility that "events of such low probability will defeat the donee's interest in the
servient property," but that the regulation also does not address compensatIOn on actual
defeasance. The court explained that: "unlike the risk addressed by the so-remote-as-to-benegligible standard, in order to satisfy the extinguishment provision, section 1.170A14(g)(6) ... provides that the donee must ab initio have an absolute nght to compensatIon
from the postextinguishment proceeds for the restrictions judicially extinguished. It is Lorna
Kaufman's failure to accord NAT an absolute right to a fixed share of the
postextinguishment proceeds that causes her gift to fail the extinguishment provision. Id. at
312-13.
103 Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman 11), 136 T.C. 294, 309 (2011).
104 Id. at 297. The form indicated that if the donation could not be processed in time to
qualify for a deduction in 2003, the charity would allow a ten percent reduction in the cash
contribution to the donor once the process was completed in 2004. Id.
105 Id. In a subsequent letter, the charity explained that the required cash donation
would be discounted by ten percent because the taxpayers had been delayed in filing their
2003 tax return because of the uncompleted easement contribution. That resulted in a
discounted cash contribution of $19,872, plus fees of $300, with a net amount due of $3,332.
That amount was due after the easement had received National Park Service certification,
which occurred August 9, 2004. The taxpayers submitted the required payment to the
charity, which in turn sent an I.R.S. Form 8283, substantiating the facade easement
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The government denied the taxpayers' deductions of cash contributions
to the charity because it asserted they were quid pro quo for the services the
charity provided regarding the fac;ade easement deductions and because
they were conditional on subsequent events (the value of the easement or
the allowance of a deduction). In its reply brief, the government agreed that
the "expected receipt of a tax deduction is not a benefit that invalidates the
deduction" but argued that the deduction must be disallowed because the
I06
The government also denied a deduction for
payments were required.
$3,032 of the 2004 cash payment to the charity, asserting the taxpayers had
"relied on a contemporaneous written acknowledgment that they knew was
inaccurate in claiming the erroneous charitable deduction."I07 The
taxpayers contended that although the payments may have been subject to a
refund, in 2004 they became fixed and deductible because the parties'
understanding was that the cash contributions were not refundable. The
taxpayers argued that the requirement of a cash contribution was a
customary practice and was what allowed the charity and similar
organizations to have operating funds to administer their easements, and
that the cash donation was not conditional on the charity'S approval of the
easement and provision of a Form 8283. \08
The court found that before the 2004 appraisal it was possible for the
easement to be valued at zero. Therefore, the court held that the taxpayers
had not satisfied their burden of proof that they were entitled to a cash
109
However, the court agreed with the
contribution deduction for 2003.
taxpayers that the clause in the agreement setting cash payments at ten
percent of the donation value was not intended to allow for a refund if the
taxpayers' deductions were disallowed. I 10 Furthermore, the court agreed
lll
requires payments to be
with the government that Hernandez
"unrequited" for them to be deductible. However, the court pointed out that
neither party had cited any precedent to support its more specific argument,
making it difficult for the court to find any benefit accruing to the taxpayers
from the cash contribution apart from its enabling the charitable
contribution. Therefore, the court allowed the taxpayers a 2004 cash
112
charitable contribution deduction for $19,872.
contribution. Id. at 300-01.
106 136 T.C.at317
107 Id.at315.
108

ld. at 315-18.

109 ld. at 316 ("Petitioners bear the burden of proving that, at the end of 2003, the
possibility of a zero appraisal value was not so remote as to be negligible.").
110 ld. at 316-17.
III

112

Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
Kaufman II at 320-22. The court noted that in another case, McMillan v.
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The second new issue in Kaufman 11 was the imposition of various
penalties, 113 for which the government bore the burden of proof. I 14 Because
of government concessions and because the taxpayers proved reasonable
cause and good faith, a statutory defense to the penalties,115 the court
upheld only the accuracy-related penalty. The court found the taxpayers had
been negligent in their 2003 underpayment attributable to the taxpayers'
cash contributions to the charity.
3.

Kaufman III

116
In Kaufman III,
both the government and the taxpayers appealed the
2010 and 2011 Tax Court decisions (Kaufman 1 & I/). The First Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the lower court's judgments, apart from its
holding on the deductibility of the taxpayers' cash contributions and the
accuracy-related penalty on the 2003 cash contribution claim, and remanded
the case for the lower court to determine the other issues consistent with the
.. 117
appe 11 ate court ' s deClSlOn.
In its brief background summary, the appellate court described the
taxpayers' need to have their mortgagee agree to subordinate its interest to
the easement charity. In their letter to the mortgagee, they stated that the
easement imposed basically the same restrictions as those imposed under

Commissioner, 31 T.e. 1143 (1959), it had disallowed a deduction for a required fee paid to
a charity to place an adopted child in the taxpayers' home. In that case, the taxpayers'
payment significantly mUTed to their benefit. By contrast, the court explamed that Kaufman's
cash payment to the charity only served to assist her to obtain a charitable deduction and no
other benefit. Kaufman 11 at 318, n.12. Moreover, the court cited Scheldelman v.
Commissioner (Scheidelman I), 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, slip op. at II (T.e. 2010), available
at http://www. ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpH istoric/Scheidelman. TCM. WPD. pdf, involving a similar
cash payment to the same easement charity in which the court denied a taxpayer deduction.
However, in Scheidelman I, the taxpayers had the burden of proof to show the extent to
which their payment exceeded the value of their benefit, and they failed to produce any
evidence to show that excess. Here, the government had to prove quid pro quo, and the court
found the evidence ambiguous. Finally, the government failed to provide evidence of the
value of Kaufman's benefit and failed to show that the taxpayers had not substantiated their
contribution as required by statute. Kaufman 11 at 319.
113 I.R.C. § 6662.
114

I.R.C. § 7491(c).

115

I.R.e. § 6662 (c).

116

Kaufman v. Shulman (Kaufman 111), 687 F.3d 21 (1st CiT. 2012).

Id. at 33. Because the Tax Court's decision not to impose penalties in connection
with the claimed noncash contributions were intertwined with its grant of partial summary
judgment in Kaufman 11, the appellate court also vacated the Tax Court's holdings on that
issue. Id. at 30. In addition, the court also held that each party was liable for its own court
costs. Id. at 33.
117
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local law. The court then stated that, if that assertion were true, then the
mortgagee "would lose little or nothing by consenting.,,118 Likewise, when
Mr. Kaufman worried that the easement would reduce the property's value
to a degree that would undermine the tax benefit from the charitable
deduction, the charity's representative "sought to reassure him that it was
'very unlikely' that the easement would affect the marketability of the
property.,,119 The taxpayers received the mortgagee's agreement to
subordinate its rights to the charity's right to enforce the easement in
perpetuity. However, the lender agreement contained a stipulation that gave
the mortgagee a prior claim to insurance proceeds from a casualty on, or a
. 0 f ,th e property. 120
cond emnatlOn
The circuit court's legal analysis of the conservation easement
charitable deduction statute and regulations focused on the subsection (g) of
the income tax regulation 121 and specifically paragraph (g)(6) that, the court
said, the Tax Court had "relied entirely on" to disallow the taxpayers'
l22
fac;ade easement deduction.
The court described what it considered to be
the two reasons for the extinguishment provision that requires that the
charity be entitled to its pro rata share of insurance proceeds: to prevent a
windfall to the easement donor and to insure that the charity could use its
123
share to pursue its charitable purpose elsewhere.
The circuit court's reading of the Tax Court's opinion was that
although the taxpayers had ostensibly satisfied the extinguishment
regulation, the lender agreement provision between the taxpayers and the
mortgagee prevents such compliance by granting the mortgagee a superior
claim to the easement charity regarding casualty and condemnation
insurance proceeds. Regarding the Tax Court's reading, the appellate court
stated that the taxpayers had no power over the mortgagee just as they had
124
no power over a preferential federal or state tax lien.
In so doing, the
circuit court did not recognize any difference between a statutory preference
and one derived by private parties to a contract.
Further, the circuit court stated that "the IRS's reading of its regulation
would appear to doom practically all donations of easements, which is

120

Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.

121

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g) (2009).

118
119

Kaufman III at 26. As noted by the court and the taxpayers, moreover, the paragraph
applies only where an extinguishment is "by judicial proceeding." Id. at 26 n.3.
123 Id. at 26.
122

124

Id. at 26-27.
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surely contrary to the purpose of Congress.,,125 While that may be true, such
an inference may not be accurate because almost all fayade easement
126
Fayade easement
deductions are taken by very wealthy individuals.
holders may either have more clout with their mortgagees than the
taxpayers in Kaufman or most fayade easement donors may not have the
financial need to carry a mortgage on their property.
Finally, the court rejected the government's reading of an easement
provision 127 that it said the government had misinterpreted to mean that the
charity had a "blank check" to consent to any statutorily disallowed
activity. The appellate court seemed to consider that provision as having no
legal effect, that is, as surplusage. Basically, the First Circuit aligned itself
128
and agreed that charitable
with the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Simmons
deductions "cannot be disallowed based upon the remote possibility [that
the donee organization] will abandon the easements." 129
Ultimately, the main thrust of the circuit court opinion was that the
case rested on factual findings and therefore granting summary judgment
was inappropriate. In its discussion of the taxpayers' valuation
overstatement, the court seemed to warm to the government's contention
that the easement was valueless, as illustrated by the following court
statements: (1) "[g]iven these pre-existing legal obligations the Tax Court
might well find on remand that the Kaufmans' easement was worth little or
nothing[,],,130 and (2) "[i]n an effort to reassure them, a Trust representative
told the Kaufmans that experience showed that such easements did not
reduce resale value, and this could easily be the IRS's opening argument in
a valuation trial.,,131 Finally, the court stated, "we do not question the IRS's
concern, transcending this case, that individuals and organizations have

125 Id. at 27 (Because of the cirCUIt court's holding on the mortgage subrogation, several
Tax Court cases filed a motion for reconsideration); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Commissioner, 106
T.e.M. (CCH) 215 (T.C. 2013) (motion to vacate decision and reconsider the court's earlier
opinion in Mitchell v. Commissioner (Mitchell 1), 138 T.e. 324 (2012) denied, with the
court's holding that Kaufman III decided legal issues (the application of the proceeds
regulation) different from the one in Mitchell 1 (application of the subordination
regulation).».
126 See infra Part III.C.Kaufman IV; supra notes 124,38, text in Part I.

127 The easement agreement states, "[N]othing herem contained shall be construed to
limit the [Trust's] right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in the Fayade) or to abandon
some or all of its rights hereunder." Kaufman 111 at 27-28.
128 Commissioner v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.e. Cir. 2011).
129

130

Id. at 10, cited in Kaufman 111 at 28.
Kaufman 111 at 31.

131 Id. The appellate court also noted that the charity "had a substantial economic
incentive" to strive for "a high valuation" due to its cash contributIOn requirement geared to
ten percent of the easement's value. Id. at 32.

Virginia Tax Review

256

[Vol. 34:229

been abusing the conservation statute "to improperly shield income or
assets from taxation.,,132
4.

Kaufman IV

In Kaufman IV, 133 the Tax Court held that each party's appraisal was
admissible, but that the taxpayers' expert's valuation approach was
defective and that the court would not give it any weight. Thus, the
taxpayers had not proved their fas;ade easement donation had any value. In
addition, the Tax Court imposed a gross valuation penalty on the taxpayers
because they had not proved they were entitled to the defense of reasonable
cause or good c.Lalt. h. 134
On remand from the appellate court, the Tax Court supplemented its
findings of fact and opinion. The court found the following facts regarding
taxpayers' appraisal. The taxpayers employed Timothy J. Hanlon, one of
the two appraisers recommended by the charity. Mr. Hanlon had written
nine reports valuing fas;ade easements for the charity in 2003 and 2004, but
had no other experience appraising partial real property interests. Mr.
Hanlon spoke with someone at the charity in connection with his first such
appraisal and his notes from that discussion indicate that with respect to
fas;ade easements in heavily regulated areas, the Service has accepted a
value of about eleven percent of the property's value, that "95% fall in this

132 ld. (The court then cited to both I.R.S. News Release lR-2005-19 (Feb. 28, 2005)
and I.R.S. News Release, lR-2006-25 (Feb. 7, 2006) (repeating language from 2005 news
release) and to the "formidable" penalties assessed against taxpayers abusing the deduction
statute).
133 Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman IV), 107 T.e.M. (CCH) 1262 (T.C. 2014),
available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHistoric/KaufmanMemo.Halpern.TCM.WPD.
pdf.
134 Other court fa9ade easement examples of protracted litigation similar to the four
Kaufman opinions are the four opinion cases Scheidelman, supra notes 10, 18, 51, 76, and
112, and WhiteHouse Hotel. WhiteHouse Hotel v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 112, 118, 172,
176 (2008) (The taxpayer's 1999 claimed deduction was $7,445,000 reduced by the court to
$1,792,30Iand resulting in the taxpayer's liability for a 40 percent gross valuation
misstatement penalty. "Therefore, on the 1997 Form 1065, the partnership claimed an
amount for the value of the servitude slightly more than 415 percent of its correct value"),
vacated and remanded, 615 F.3d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 2010), (with the Tax Court on remand
valuing the fa9ade easement at $1,857,716, subject to the forty percent penalty. See
Whitehouse Hotel v. Commissioner, 139 T.e. 304, 348, 361-62 (2012)), aJJ'd in part (on the
valuation issue) and vacated in part and remanded (on the penalty issue), _ F.3d _ (5th
Cir. 2014) (reversing as clearly erroneous, the court stated, "Obtaining a qualified appraisal,
analyzing that appraisal, commissioning another appraisal, and submitting a professionallyprepared tax return is sufficient to show a good faith investigation as required by law.").
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135

percentage," and that he "could use 11.5%-12.5%."
Mr. Kaufman, a professor emeritus of the Sloan School of Management
at M.LT, a specialist in statistical analysis,136 emailed a representative of
the charity that he was concerned about the resale devaluation of a fayade
burdened home and asked for statistical documentation on the potential for
such an effect. In response, the charity's representative emailed him that
there would be no valuation loss created by the easement.
We have tracked 26 resold properties to-date on which we held an
easement, andnone was resold at a loss or had any issues for resale
that we are aware of .... Over 100 lenders have approved to
subordinate their loans to our easements to-date in over 800 cases.
* * * Why would these banks (including yours) approve these
transactions if they saw a risk or adverse financial impact on their
collateral? ?* * *One of our directors, Steve McClain, owns
fifteen or so historic properties and has taken advantage of this tax
deduction himself. He would have never granted any easement if
he thought there would be a risk or loss of value in his
. 137
propertIes.
In a letter to their mortgagee, moreover, the taxpayers stated: "[t]he
easement restrictions are essentially the same restrictions as those imposed
by current local ordinances that govern this property.,,138
The government's expert, John C. Bowman III, a Massachusetts
certified general real estate appraiser, held a Certificate of Completion for
the Valuation of Conservation Easements program offered by the American
Society of Appraisers and had served on the Boston Landmarks
Commission for ten years, serving as chairman of the commission for six
years. "He ha[ d] extensive experience appraising partial interests in real
property, including conservation easements.,,139 Mr. Bowman reviewed
both the Hanlon appraisal and an appraisal prepared by Joan Gootee, a
Service employee. His preliminary view on the Hanlon appraisal was that
there was no devaluation related to development potential since the property
was being used at its highest and best use as a single-family home. In
determining the value of the easement, Hanlon used a percentage discount
to the unencumbered value of the property and made no appraisal of the
"after" easement value despite his acknowledging that the "before and

135
136

Kaufman IV slip op. at 7-9.
Id. slip op. at 4.

138

Id. slip op. at 11.
Id.

139

Id. slip op. at 13.

137
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after" approach was the correct appraisal method for conservation
140
Further, Bowman agreed with the conclusion of the Gootee
easements.
appraisal that the easement duplicated local historic building restrictions.
For those reasons, Bowman concluded that the fa~ade easement value was
141
zero.
The court's opinion began with a discussion of which party held the
burden of proof on the value of the fa~ade easement, but ultimately held it
need not decide that issue because the court was able to determine "the
valuation question on the basis of essentially agreed facts along with the
assistance we may find helpful in the parties' expert's opinions.,,142 On the
penalties issue, by statute,143 the government has the burden of production;
but, if it has met that burden, the taxpayers have the burden to prove that
144
they should not be subject to those penalties due to reasonable cause.
Next, the court addressed the valuation issue. The fair market value of
a conservation easement is its value at contribution. Where there are no
significant comparable sales, the easement's value is determined by
subtracting the "after" (encumbered) value of the property from the
"before" (unencumbered) value of the property. The taxpayers contended
that its value was $220,800, while the government asserted its value was
145
zero.
In great detail, the court discussed each expert's report and
methodology. The court found that the experts were qualified experts but
expressed concern about the close relationship between Hanlon and the
charity.146 The court also stated that the charity had an interest in

140

Id. slip op. at 14.

141

ld.

142

ld. slip op. at 16.

143

I.R.C. § 7491(c).

144

Kaufman IV slip op. at 17.
Id. slip op. at 18.

145

146 ld. slip op. at 47 ("What does concern us with respect to Mr. Hanlon's qualification
to testify, however, is his close relationship With NAT. His only experience in appraising
facade easements is the nine reports that he did with respect to nine facade-easement
contributions to NAT. He looked to NAT to learn how appraisals of facade easements were
done before he attempted the first of those reports, and he submitted a draft of the first report
to NAT for validation before he completed it. He incorporated in his reports wording
suggested by NAT. After he completed eight reports, NAT's director of operations, Ms.
Bookwalter, expressed NAT's satisfaction with his work but required that he add a document
(the easement document) to all future reports. The tone of her communication to him
suggests that she believed that NAT had a proprietary interest in Mr. Hanlon's reports. She
begins her communication by speaking of "the 8 appraisals you have done for the National
Architectural Trust". (Emphasis added.) Without asking permission from him, she says that
NAT would add the easement document to the reports he had already submitted. She
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overvaluing an easement due to its ten percent required cash donation and
that Mr. Hanlon would benefit by the charity's continued recommendation
·
.
147
o fh 1m as an appraIser.
The court found that Hanlon's valuation was primarily based on
imposing a percentage on the pre-contribution value of the property. That
percentage was derived from unsubstantiated and generalized conclusions
of a report the charity provided to him. The court rejected Hanlon's
methodology since even he had conceded "that his deconstruction of the
15% upper bound in the Primoli article into smaller, component percentages
reflective of the burdens imposed by a facade easement was a method
unique to him and not a generally accepted appraisal practice or valuation
method.,,148 Likewise, the court rejected similar, unsubstantiated additional
percentages that Hanlon applied to value the easement. 149
On the other hand, the court found the testimony of the government's
expert, Bowman, more reliable. Bowman concluded "that the typical buyer
would find the restrictions of the preservation restriction no more
burdensome than the underlying South End Landmark District Standards
150
The court
and Criteria" and that the fayade easement had no value.

thanked him for his work and expressed NAT's expectation that it would work with him in
the future.").
147 Id. slip op. at 48-49.
148 Id. slip op. at 50-51 (The court stated, "Mr. Hanlon's starting pOInt-that properties
in lightly regulated areas suffer a 15% reduction in value on account of the severance and
conveyance of a facade easement-is based on neither reliable market data nor specific
attributes of the property. It is based on what he believes the courts and the IRS had allowed
in prior cases. Whether it is an upper or lower bound, there is no standard percentage to
which one may make adjustments to arrive at a value appropriate for a particular property.").
149 Id. slip op. at 52-53 ("When asked how he came to the conclusion that the
marketability of property would be diminished by 2%, he answered: "[I]1's common sense"
that the more restricted property "is going to have lower marketability." He did not,
however, explain how he got to 2%. He testified that he based the 0.5% that he assigned to
"recapture" on "what I felt the limitation on marketability would be." As to the 1.25% he
assigned to "maintenance and insurance requirements in excess of unencumbered
properties", he admitted that he did no analysis to arrive at that figure and "just chose" it.
Similarly, with respect to the 0.5% assigned to "legal exposure if easement is breached":
"just judgment." Simply put, given his limited experience appraising facade easements and
his apparent preconception that the component percentages would total 15% in a lightly
regulated area, we are not persuaded that Mr. Hanlon's common sense, feelings, and
judgment constitute a reliable basis for the percentage reductions in value that he assigned to
each of the constituent burdens constituting a facade easement (and, further, the adjustments
he made to those percentages to reflect differences between the burdens imposed by the
South End Standards and Criteria and the burdens imposed by the preservation
agreement).").
150 Id. slip op. at 55.
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compared the easement restrictions with the limitations imposed by local
law and held that the taxpayers had not shown that the easement reduced
the value of the property. "To the contrary, our own comparison of the two
sets of restrictions and Mr. Bowman's expert testimony [has] convinced us
that the restrictive components of the preservation agreement are basically
duplicative of, and not materially different from, the South End Standards
and Criteria, and we so find." 151
An accuracy-related twenty percent penaltyl52 is imposed where an
income tax underpayment is due to negligence, a substantial understatement
or a substantial valuation misstatement. 153 Where there is a gross valuation
154 th
Ity'IS fiorty percent. 155 A taxpayer may b e excuse d
.
mIsstatement,
e pena
from the penalty upon reasonable cause and good faith;156 however, that
exception is only available when the taxpayer's valuation was based on a
"qualified appraisal" by a "qualified appraiser" and the taxpayer made a
good-faith investigation of the value of the contributed property.157 In
Kaufman, the government argued for the imposition of a forty percent
penalty; the taxpayers claimed they fell within the reasonable cause
exception and thus should be exempt from the penalty. 158
Although the court found that Mr. Hanlon was a qualified appraiser as
defined by the statute,159 it also found that the taxpayers did not satisfy the
160
good faith investigation requirement of the exemption.
The taxpayers
looked to the charity's emails to prove they were not liable for the penalty;
yet, those very emails indicated that they knew the imposition of a fac;ade
easement would not devalue their property. 161 In determining good faith
reliance, the court considers a taxpayer's educational background and
experience. In this instance, Mr. "Kaufman was a sophisticated consumer of

151

152

Id. slip op. at 63.
I.R.C. § 6662.

153 A substantial misstatement is where the claimed value is 200 percent or more of the
correct value of the property. See I.R.C. § 6662(e)(1)(8)(i).
154 A gross misstatement is where the claimed value is 400 percent or more of the
correct value of the property. See I.R.C. § 6662(h)(1)-(2).
155 I.R.C. § 6662(h)(1).
156

I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).

157

I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2)-(3).

158

Kaufman IV slIp op. at 66.

159

Id. at 71; see I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2)(A).
Kaufman IV slip op. at 72.

160

161 Id. slip op. at 73-74. The taxpayers also claimed that they relied on their accountant
for the valuation overstatement; however, the court pointed out that "the value of the facade
easement involves an issue (valuation) on which [their accountant] neither was qualified to
advise petitioners nor advised them." Id. slip op. at 77.

2014]

Alms to the Rich: The Fa(:ade Easement Deduction

261

statistical analyses, and both the [charity's representative's] email and the
Hanlon appraisal gave him good reason to question Mr. Hanlon's value
conclusion." 162
IV. THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006
The PP A made numerous changes specifically to the fayade easement
charitable deduction provisions. First, not only the front of a historic
· extenor
. 163 must be sub'~ect to th e easement an d 1tS
.
structure, b ut th e entire
164
restrictions.
According to its legislative history, to be a qualified real
property interest, the entire exterior refers to "the space above the building,
the sides, the rear, and the front of the building" 165 and no part of the
exterior may be changed in a way "inconsistent with the historical character
of such exterior." 166 The PP A requires substantiation that the charitable
organization is a qualified recipient with "the resources to manage and
enforce the restriction and a commitment to do SO.,,167 Further, appraisal

162 ld. slip op. at 80. AlternatIvely, the court upheld the accuracy related penalties
imposed because of negligence or a substantial misstatement as defined under I.R.C.
§ 6662(e)(l)(A). The court cited to both Mr. Kaufman's disregard of the error in the Hanlon
appraisal and the taxpayers' carelessness in certifying to the mortgagee that the easement
restrictions were virtually the same as those imposed by local law while they were
simultaneously claiming large deductions attributable solely to the easement's restrictions.
ld. slip op. at 81-82. The court rejected the taxpayers' argument that there was substantial
authority to support their positions and that they had a reasonable basis for their tax
treatment. ld. slip op. at 85. Finally, the court held that the government met its burden of
production on the issue of the existence of substantial understatements and that the taxpayers
did not prove either reasonable cause or good faith exceptions for their understatements. ld.
slip op. at 86.
163 LR.C. § l70(h)(4)(8)(i)(I) ("including the front, sides, rear, and height of the
building").
164 See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(8)(i)(II) ("prohibits any change in the exterior of the building
which is inconsIstent with the historical character of such exterior").

165 H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 145 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 H. CONF. REP.]; STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., GEN EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED
IN THE 109TH CONG., 590 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter 2007 JOINT COMM.
EXPLANATION)'
166 LR.C. § 170(h)(4)(8)(i)(II); see 2006 H. CONF. REP., supra note 165; 2007 JOINT
COMM. EXPLANATION, supra, note 165.
167 LR.C. § 170(h)(4)(8)(ii) (I)-(lI); see 2006 H. CONF. REP., supra note 165 ("In
addition, the donor and the donee must enter into a written agreement certifying, under
penalty of perjury, that the donee is a qualIfied organization, with a purpose of
environmental protection, land conservation, open space preservation, or historic
preservation, and that the donee has the resources to manage and enforce the restriction and a
commitment to do so.").
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170
The appraiser must sign a declaration that he or
by certified appraisers.
she is aware of the penalty imposed on the appraiser who should have
known that the appraisal was being used as part of a tax return or refund
claim if the appraisal results in a substantial overvaluation. The legislation
imposes a $500 enforcement fee to be paid to the Service on a donor
claiming the deduction for a fayade easement valued at the greater of: three
percent of the property's fair market value or $10,000. 171 Finally, for
property receiving or having received a rehabilitation tax credit l72 for the
past five years, there is a requirement that the additional benefit of the
173
fayade easement deduction be reduced. At the same time, the PPA added
I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(B)(iii) (stating that the taxpayer must include "with the taxpayer's
return for the taxable year of the contribution- (I) a qualified appraisal (within the meaning
of subsection (f)(ll)(E)) of the qualified property interest, (II) photographs of the entire
exterior of the building, and (III) a description of all restrictions on the development of the
building."). 2006 H. CONF. REP., supra note 165 states that:
168

For any contribution relating to a registered historic district made after the date
of enactment of the provision, taxpayers must include with the return for the
taxable year of the contribution a qualIfied appraisal of the qualified real property
interest (irrespective of the claimed value of such interest) and attach the
appraisal with the taxpayer's return, photographs of the entire exterior of the
building, and descriptions of all current restrictions on development of the
building, including, for example, zoning laws, ordinances, neighborhood
association rules, restrictive covenants, and other similar restrictions. Failure to
obtain and attach an appraisal or to include the required information results in
disallowance of the deduction.
2006 H. CONF. REP., supra note 165, at 338; see I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advisory 201334039
(Aug. 23, 2013).
169 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(i).
170

I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii), (iii).

I.R.C. § 170(f)(13) ("Contributions of certain interests in buildings located in
registered historic districts - (A) In general -No deductIon shall be allowed with respect to
any contribution described in subparagraph (B) unless the taxpayer includes with the return
for the taxable year of the contribution a $500 filing fee. (B) Contribution described - A
contribution is described in this subparagraph if such contribution is a qualified conservation
contribution (as defined in subsection (h)) which is a restriction with respect to the exterior
of a building described in subsection (h)(4)(C)(ii) and for which a deduction is claimed in
excess of $10,000. (C) Dedication of fee -Any fee collected under this paragraph shall be
used for the enforcement of the provisions of subsection (h)."). See 2006 H. CONF. REp.,
supra note 165, at 338-39.
172 I.R.C. § 47.
171

173 I.R.C. § 170(f)(l4) ("In the case of any qualified conservation contribution (as
defined in subsection (h)), the amount of the deduction allowed under this section shall be
reduced by an amount which bears the same ratio to the fair market value of the contribution
as- (A) the sum of the credits allowed to the taxpayer under section 47 for the 5 preceding
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what was at that time a two-year provision (for 2006 and 2007) to increase
the percentage limitations on current year deductibility of noncash capital
gain real property conservation contributions from thirty to fifty percent; 174
that temporary provision has been extended in two-year intervals with the
175
most recent amendment retaining the benefit through 2013.
V. REPEAL, NOT REFORM: POST-PPA PROPOSALS

There have been legislative efforts to reform conservation easements,
including fa~ade easements. Some have been enacted into law; other good
176
efforts have not.
However, what is clear in the constant patching or "fine

taxable years with respect to any building which is a part of such contribution, bears to (B)
the fair market value of the building on the date of the contribution"). That is, the reduced
donation deduction amount is calculated by multiplying the value of the fa<;ade easement by
the fraction that is the same ratio as the sum of those credits for the past five years to the
building's value when the fa<;ade easement contributIOn was made.
If the aggregate amount of credits claimed by the taxpayer within such five year
period is $100,000, and the fair market value of the building with respect to
which the contribution is made is $1,000,000, the taxpayer must reduce the
amount of the deduction by 10 percent (or 100,000 over 1,000,000).
2007 JOINT COMM . EXPLANATION, supra note 165, at 591 .
174 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1206(a), 120 Stat. 780,
1068-69 (2006) (codified at I.R.e. § 170(b)(I )(E)). This is an exception to the thirty percent
limitation under Inter I.R.C. § I 70(b)(I )(8). The 100 percent limitation under
§ 170(b)(l)(E)(iv), also enacted as part of the PPA, is only applicable to "qualified farmers
and ranchers" as defined in section 170(b)(I)(E)(v). See I.R.S. Notice 2007-50, 2007-1 e.B.
1430 (providing guidance on the PPA percentage limitations).
175 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(vi), as enacted in the PPA, was a two-year provisIOn that was
intended to last through 2007. The statute has been extended several times so that the current
provision, enacted in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, currently extends through
2013. American Taxpayer Rehef Act of2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 206(a), 126 Stat. 2313,
2324 (2013). Conservation Easement Incentive Act of2014, H.R. 2807, 113TH CONGo (2013)
seeks to make the provision a permanent one. See Bill Summary & Status, LIBR. OF CONG.,
THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dI13:HR02807:@@@D&summ2=m&
(last action Jun. 26, 2014) (showing the current status of the bill).
176 See, e.g., 2005 JOINT COMM. FA<;:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 284 (an
example of a proposal that was not enacted into law). The Tax Court, in Glass court referred
to the 2005 Joint Committee proposal and stated that the Committee characterized section
170(h) as too broad to enable the government to dispute a taxpayer's claim of a conservation
purpose, particularly because both the donor and donee are motivated to agree on that
characterization. See Glass V. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 258, 285 n.19 (2005) (citing 2005
JOINT COMM. F A<;:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 286). The Glass court stated
that the proposal would not only require the "protection of natural habitats" purpose in
section 170(h)(4)(A)(li) be tied to "a clearly defined governmental policy; i.e., it furthers a
specific, identified conservation project," but also would deny the donor or his family the
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tuning" of this Code section is that abuse is unavoidable and that there are
better ways to provide a public benefit. Clearly, repeal is warranted. l77
One major positive effort for partial repeal of the fa<;ade easement was
the 2005 Joint Committee proposal. The Committee's recommendation
provided that there would be no deduction for the contribution of a historic
fa<;ade easement "relating to a certified historic structure that recently has
been or is being used or is reasonably expected to be used, by the donor or a
family member of the donor as a personal residence (principal or
otherwise).,,178 For historic buildings not having a personal residence use,
such as commercial, rental, or investment property, the Committee's
recommendation was not for repeal and was more complex. For those
easements, its proposal allowed a charitable deduction equal to the lesser of
5% of the value of the building (ignoring the existence of the easement) or
33% of the fa<;ade easement's value. The proposal contained recapture rules
if the property was converted to personal residential use within eleven years
179
of the contribution.
Donors would be required to report the conversion
both to the Service and to the donee easement holder. 180
While the Committee's proposal is a vast improvement over current
law, its nonresidential use recommendation both incorporates the everl81
problematic valuation issue of a fa<;ade easement (due to the thirty-three
percent alternative) and may engender enforcement issues with its complex
recapture provision and reporting requirements. The Committee's report
acknowledged the valuation problem in general terms: "[ v ]aluation
difficulties and conservation purpose issues are especially problematic in
the case of a contribution of a partial interest in property, such as
easements, because the donor both relinquishes and retains rights and value
relating to the underlying property.,,182 Moreover, in its discussion
justifying repeal of personal use residential property easements, the
Committee noted issues that would likewise apply to nonresidential
property easements: "[s]uch personal use cases involve competing public

right to use any part of the land as a personal residence after the contribution. The court
pointed out that if those recommendations had been in effect with respect to the Glass'
conservation easements, since they lived on the unencumbered part of the property, they
would have been denied their deduction. ld.
177 See Halperin, supra note 13, at 313 ("None of the lesser remedies are recommended
here, however, because of the strength of the case for repeaL").
178 2005 JOINT COMM. F A<,:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 282.
179 Id. The proposal required 100% recapture within two years of the contribution, and a
ten percent reduced recapture for each year beginning in the third post contribution year. Id.
180

Id.

181

See supra Part lILA.

182

2005

JOINT COMM. FA<,:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL,

supra note 6, at 284.
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and private interests, as well as subjectivity regarding valuation of the
contributed partial interest, that are not efficiently addressed in a context
where proper valuations are expensive and the IRS lacks the expertise or
resources to assess conservation purposes,,183 and indeed justified its
imposition of a percentage limitation on the deduction because of valuation
184
difficulties.
While the report states that "weighing competing public and private
benefits when the underlying property is the donor's residence is inherently
more difficult than when the underlying property is to be used for
investment or commercial purposes,,,185 it does not explain how it has
186
Increased property values are likely to apply
arrived at this conciusion.
to nonresidential property because of historic preservation restrictions just
as they adhere to similarly encumbered residential properties.
The latest proposal to amend the fayade easement deduction is twofold: to deny a deduction for not developing the space above historic
buildings and to extend the PPA amendments to National Register
18
properties. ? The Joint Committee analysis begins with a statement of the
continued valuation problems in the area of the charitable contribution of
partial property interests. "Whether due to mistake, incompetence,

183

Id.

184

Id. at 286 ("However, sigmficant valuation concerns justify a cap on the deductIOn

amount for contributions of such other properties. The proposed cap of 33 percent of the
value of the easement goes directly to valuation abuses pertaining to easements.'').
185

Id. at 285. The report also states, without discussion or explanation. that "[i]n

general, property held for business or investment purposes is not subject to the same
concerns of competing public and private benefits applicable to property used as a personal
residence." Id. at 286.
186 The Chandler court explains the different considerations that apply to commercial
property WIth fayade easements:

Restrictions on construction impair the value of commercial property more
tangIbly than they impair the value of residential property. Commercial property
derives its value from its ability to generate cash flows. For commercial property,
development generally correlates with increased future cash flows. More retail
space, more space for tenants, and more room for customers generally increase
profitability. Restrictions on the development of commercial property reduce
potential for increased future cash flows and thus diminish value.
Chandler v. Commissioner, No. 16534-08,2014 WL 1924147, at *7 (T.e. May 14,2014).
187 See DEP'T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL
YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS, 162 (2013) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR
2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS]; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG.,

DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL
YEAR 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL 125 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF
2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL)'
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misunderstanding of the law or facts, or efforts to evade taxes, valuation
misstatements are common." 188 Those difficulties are inherently present
because (1) there is no market for fac;:ade easements,189 and (2) the
definition of fair market value requires a buyer and a seller with competing
interests 190 and that tension is absent between the donor and charitable
191
In its analysis, the Joint Committee continued to invoke the
donee.
ln
As justification for the
concerns expressed in the Service's 2004 Notice.
first proposed amendment, the Committee again described the difficulty and
expense of contesting these easement deductions:
The first part of the proposal provides that a taxpayer may not take
a deduction for any reduction in value resulting from forgone
upward development of an historic building. As noted by the
Treasury Department, "Some taxpayers... have taken large
deductions for contributions of easements restricting the upward
development of historic urban buildings even though such
development was already restricted by local authorities. Because of
the difficulty of determining the value of the contributed easement,
it is difficult and costly for the Internal Revenue Service to
challenge deductions for historic preservation easements.' 193
Because the PPA did not subject National Register properties to its
additional requirements, the second part of the proposal on fac;:ade
easements extends those rules to both because of the same policy concerns

188

2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 187, at 125.

189 ld. at 126 ("[I]n general, there is no market and thus no comparable sales data for
such easements.").
190 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-I(b) (1992).

191 2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 187, at 125
("Unlike in an arm's length negotiation, in a charitable contribution situation, the interests of
a donor and a donee organization are not adverse. A donee organization may have no
knowledge of the amount a donor has claimed as the value of the easement and, even if
known, has no incentive to question a donor's inflated value because there is no
countervailing tax consequence to the donee if a donor inflates the value of contributed
property, i.e., the donee generalIy does not pay tax on the receipt of the contribution or a
subsequent disposition of the contributed property. Some donees may even directly or
indirectly support an inflated value III order to secure a desired gift. Such circumstances
cause the valuation of property in the charitable contribution context to be a particularly
difficult determination.").
192 ld. at 127 (noting that "[t]he proposal is a direct response to such policy concerns.");
see I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, 2004-1 e.B. 31.
193 2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 187, at 127
n.324 (emphasis added) (citing ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS,
supra note 187, at 162).
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expressed about the first part of the proposal and in order to provide
194
While
consistency in this area of favade easement charitable donation.
extending the application of the PPA to National Register Properties is
another improvement, this latest amendment does not satisfactorily deal
with the inadequacies of the PP A or the endemic issues persistent with
favade easements.
CONCLUSION

In today's world, real estate is often subject to regulation that buyers
and their neighbors accept in order to retain and increase a community's
property values. The wealthiest of homeowners who purchase homes in
historic districts willingly accept local restrictions on the use of their
property. There is little reason to retain the fayade easement deduction tax
benefit and there are many reasons to urge its repeal: the revenue loss, the
small number of beneficiaries, the financial demographics of that group of
beneficiaries, the continual marked overvaluation and abuse despite
Congressional, court, and administrative review and expenses, and the
dubious industries that are supported by the deduction, but whose practices
contribute to inflated and improper deductions. Very few benefit from the
large deductions, least of all the public.

194

127.

2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 187, at 123,

